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1 Introduction 
A general welfare state requires sizable tax revenues. Hence, politicians are concerned with 
maintaining sufficient tax revenues. However, politicians are also anxious to be re-elected and 
most people and potential voters tend to dislike taxes, since they reduce their consumption 
possibilities. A key question for policy makers is consequently how sufficient tax revenues 
can be raised at a minimized political cost. (Hettich and Winer, 1984) 
This reasoning indicates that it is not sufficient to know that people prefer lower 
taxes; it is also important to know what taxes people are most and least reluctant to and why.1  
Different taxes meet different degrees of support among different groups, depending on tax 
bases and preferences.2 It is therefore interesting to compare different taxes in terms of the 
determinants of public support. Such information can be useful in order to achieve an efficient 
tax system, for instance when combating socially inefficient lobbying and rent seeking 
(Stiglitz, 2002), and when contemplating design of information campaigns aiming at alleviate 
tax misperceptions.3  
In this paper, we analyse the public opinion regarding the level of eleven differ-
ent taxes in Sweden, which is the EU country with highest tax-to-GDP ratio.4 Since it would 
be an almost insurmountable task to capture all taxes in Sweden, we have selected taxes that 
differ in three relevant respects: (a) motives (i.e. whether primarily motivated by redistribu-
                                                 
1 See e.g. Hettich and Winer (1984, 1988), Gemmell et al. (2004) and Gill and Haurin (2001). 
2 Gemmell et al. (2004) study preferences for income and commodity taxes in the UK and find that tax prefer-
ences are dominated by self-interest. 
3 Gemmell et al. (2004) find that people with mispredictions tend to overestimate their tax liabilities. 
4 The Swedish tax-to-GDP ratio was 50.5 % in 2004. 
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tion, externalities, or by fiscal reasons), (b) tax bases and (c) fiscal importance. The taxes in 
focus are the real estate tax, inheritance tax, gift tax, payroll tax, municipal income tax, state 
income tax, annual vehicle tax, alcohol tax, tax on wealth, corporate tax, and the CO2 tax on 
petrol and diesel.5  
 During recent years there has been a growing interest in the use of taxes for cor-
recting market failures, so called Pigouvian taxes (Pigou, 1924; see Baumol & Oates, 1988 
for an early text book), which are implemented in order to change behaviour and/or to inter-
nalize a social cost. The Swedish CO2 tax on diesel and petrol is an example of such a tax. 
Pigouvian taxes differ from fiscally motivated taxes, where the primary purpose is to raise 
revenues and to affect behaviour as little as possible and thereby allowing the market mecha-
nisms to work without the interference of distorting taxes. In Sweden the present government 
has implemented a so called green tax shift, where environmental taxes are increased while 
taxes on labour are decreased in parallel. One of our objectives is to find out whether there is 
any public support for this reform – measured by support for the CO2 tax relative to taxes on 
labour – and if so, also to see if there are prospects to accelerate it. We find certain support for 
this, because the CO2 tax is less unpopular than the taxes on labour income. However, the 
picture is complex and there are large differences between different respondents. Low income 
earners and car owners are more reluctant to the CO2 tax than to labour income taxes, while 
highly educated respondents and those who worry about climate change tend to support a 
green tax reform. 
                                                 
5 It should be noted that the survey was made in 2004, i.e. before the abolition of the gift and the inheritance 
taxes. 
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We ask for people’s attitudes to the level of each of the eleven taxes, whether 
they regard them as too high, too low or as being at an optimal level. We use original survey 
data, with a net response rate of 64 %, of a random sample of Swedes, aged 15 – 85. 
Section 2 contains a simple theoretical model and a discussion on some of the 
key aspects where one can expect opinions to differ between taxes. That section also contains 
our hypotheses that we test empirically. In Section 3 we present the data, and in Section 4 we 
discuss our model and econometric results, and also two Swedish policy cases. A concluding 
discussion in Section 5 ends the paper. 
 
2 Generating hypotheses 
We are interested in explaining people’s preferences for various tax levels and we illustrate 
this with a simple model. Let us assume that individuals maximise their utility, U, of the con-
sumption of a vector of goods and services, C and of the public sector, G.  
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There are n different kinds of incomes, Yi , each taxed at a certain rate, τi. The K different con-
sumption goods, ck are also taxed at different rates, τk, e.g. through excise taxes on fuel and 
alcohol. 
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There are H taxpayers in the economy. Tax revenues are used to finance the 
public sector, G. The quality by which it is governed is q, which is the quality of politicians. 
A high q implies that the politicians are successful in turning tax revenue into the public good. 
Some of the commodity taxes not only finance public activities; they also aim at preventing 
unwanted behaviour. For example, the alcohol tax prevents people from excessive alcohol 
consumption and the CO2 tax reduces environmental damage. The “good” associated with the 
specific tax is γk(τk), which is increasing in the tax rate. The importance of this specific task is 
measured by βk≥0.  
When calculating the individual’s preferred tax rates, we maximise (1) with re-
spect to each tax rate. For income taxes, the preferred tax rate τi is determined by the follow-
ing first-order condition: 
 
∑′=′
h
ihGiC YqUYU  .     (2) 
This means that the higher the individual’s specific income Yi, the lower is the preferred tax 
rate. On the other hand, the more he supports the public sector, the quality of the politicians, 
and the higher the others’ income of the specific ΣYih, the higher the preferred tax rate will 
be.6 The effect of the individual’s total income is not clear. On the one hand, low income in-
creases the marginal utility of consumption, which consequently makes the “own” tax effect 
more harmful. On the other hand, lower income generally implies more support from the pub-
lic sector, which means that the marginal utility of the public sector increases.  
 
                                                 
6 The marginal utility of G could reflect the opinion about the public sector as such, as well as the personal con-
sumption of G. 
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For a commodity tax, the condition is similar: 
( ) 




′+′=
+
′ ∑ kk
h
khG
k
k
c cqU
c
U
k
γβ
τ1
    (3) 
Also here the individual prefers a lower tax rate if his own consumption of the good is large 
and if his marginal utility of that specific good is high. The things speaking in favour of a 
high tax rate are the same as in the case of income taxes with one addition. In this case the 
specific good being financed by the tax is also of importance. A person who is concerned with 
the environment has a high value of βk and thus favours higher environmental taxation. This is 
especially so if the person believes that the environmental tax is actually contributing to the 
improvement of the environment (i.e. kγ ′  is high) and also if the quality of politicians is high; 
i.e., that the popularly elected are doing what they are expected to do. 
With guidance from the above mentioned results, we can formulate the follow-
ing hypotheses: 
 
H1: An individual is more likely to prefer decreases of taxes that he/she is paying than of 
other taxes. 
 
It follows from equations (2) and (3), that the more one is affected by a tax; the 
lower one wants it to be. Also Gemmell et al. (2004) found that self-interest explained a lot of 
tax preferences. From (2) and (3) we also see that the quality of politicians, q, affects the pre-
ferred rate of all taxes. It is more important when tax bases are large and when concern for a 
specific good is strong. If one does not trust politicians, this means that one believes that q is 
low and therefore prefers lower taxes. Hence, 
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H2: People who distrust politicians are more likely than others to be in favour of tax cuts and 
the effects are strongest for corrective taxes and for fiscal taxes. 
 
We also control for a general attitude towards the public sector by controlling for political 
sympathies in the left – right dimension. Respondents who have left-wing sympathies gener-
ally prefer a larger public sector and those who have right-wing sympathies are less commit-
ted to a comprehensive public sector compared with those in the political middle.  A high 
value of βk in (3) means that people who worry about climate change should be more suppor-
tive of environmental taxes and those who consider excessive alcohol consumption as a large 
problem should prefer higher alcohol taxes than others. Hence, we state a third hypothesis: 
 
H3: Corrective taxes are more supported by those who are concerned by the issue. 
 
Some of the factors derived in (2) and (3) are not certain factors, but rather expectations. We 
are not certain about the quality of politicians and we may have misperceptions when it comes 
to real tax burdens as well as the effects of corrective taxes. Gemmell et al. (2004) found that 
misperception generally implies an overestimation of tax liabilities. Therefore we assume that 
information and education decrease the misperception and thereby increase the preferred tax 
levels.    
 
H4: Information and education has a positive impact on preferred tax levels. 
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3 Empirical strategy 
3.1 Data and descriptive results 
We use survey responses from a mail questionnaire sent out in the autumn of 2004 to a ran-
dom sample of 3,000 Swedes, aged 15 – 85, whose addresses were collected from the Na-
tional Register. In total 1,774 individuals returned the questionnaire (net response rate is 
64%). The sample is representative of the Swedish population at large (Nilsson, 2005).7  
In Table 1 below the responses to the question “Do you think that the following 
taxes ought to be increased or decreased?”, i.e. our dependent variables, are presented. The 
opinion balance measure to the far right in the table shows the share of respondents who wish 
to decrease the tax, minus the share who wishes to increase it. In general, when compared 
with suggestions to increase them, most people prefer to decrease taxes. Nevertheless, some 
of the taxes have a relatively strong support. For example, we see that for the full sample the 
opinion balance for the corporate tax is only (8 %)8 and for the wealth tax (24 %). In this per-
spective it is also interesting to see that the CO2 tax earns a rather strong relative “support” 
(36 %) being the third least unpopular tax of the eleven being studied. We also see that the 
real estate tax (70 %), inheritance tax (66 %) and gift tax (63 %) are the three taxes that most 
people prefer to decrease or completely remove. For the restricted sample of 701 respondents 
– consisting of those who have an opinion about the levels of all eleven taxes – we see that 
                                                 
7 The SOM institute (Society-Opinion-Media) administers the data collection. The institute is managed jointly by 
the Department of Political Science, Public Administration and Journalism/Mass Communication at Göteborg 
University. See http://www.som.gu.se/english.htm for more information on the SOM institute. 
8 Note, however, that a large number of respondents have no opinion about this tax, which, presumably affect the 
outcome and partly explain the exceptionally low opinion balance. This is a tax that not many people are directly 
affected by. One reason for the large share of ”no opinion” can thus be the relative anonymity. 
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the ‘ranking’ via opinion balance is identical, but we also see that there are differences when 
comparing the more exact distribution of support.  
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Table 1. Attitudes towards different tax levels
 
 
  
Full sample, %  (n=1690) 
 No 
response 
Ought to be 
significantly 
decreased 
/abolished  
Ought to be 
slightly de-
creased 
Neither ought to 
be decreased 
nor increased  
Ought to be 
slightly in-
creased 
Ought to be 
significantly 
increased 
No opinion Opinion 
balance 
Real estate tax 1 39 32 17 1 0 10 +70 
Inheritance tax 2 52 18 12 3 1 12 +66 
Gift tax  2 48 19 14 3 1 13 +63 
Payroll tax 3 14 36 25 2 0 20 +48 
State income tax 2 12 40 32 5 0 9 +47 
Annual vehicle tax  2 13 39 33 5 1 7 +46 
Municipal income tax 2 8 42 35 5 0 8 +45 
Alcohol tax 1 20 35 25 6 6 7 +43 
CO2 tax on petrol and diesel 2 19 30 29 10 3 7 +36 
Wealth tax 2 25 18 24 13 6 12 +24 
Corporate tax 5 6 15 29 11 2 32 +8 
  
Restricted sample, %  (n=701) 
Real estate tax - 43 34  21 2 1  - +74 
Inheritance tax - 58 20  16 4 1  - +73 
Gift tax  - 53 21  20 4 1  - +69 
Payroll tax - 17 44  33 4 0  - +57 
State income tax - 14 45  35 5 1  - +53 
Annual vehicle tax  - 24 38  28 6 5  - +51 
Municipal income tax - 9 46  38 6 0  - +49 
Alcohol tax - 13 40  40 7 1 - +45 
CO2 tax on petrol and diesel - 21 31  34 11 2  - +39 
Wealth tax - 29 20  28 16 7  - +26 
Corporate tax - 10 22  47 16 4  - +12 
The attitudes of tax levels were measured by the following question: ”Do you think that the following taxes should be increased or decreased?”  
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In Table 2 we present some crucial features of the included taxes, i.e., motiva-
tion, tax revenue and liability. As can be seen, the selected set of taxes capture a rather satis-
fying variety of combinations.   
 
Table 2. Schematic description of taxes by motivation, revenues, and tax liability 
Tax Primary motivation A Secondary motiva-
tion B 
Revenues 
2003, 
billion 
SEK C 
Tax liable  
Municipal in-
come tax (on 
labour income) 
Fiscal, aim to finance public 
goods and services. 
Redistribution  403 Income earners 
State income tax 
(on labour in-
come) 
Redistribution  Fiscal 33 Income earners, especially high 
income earners 
Payroll tax Fiscal, Social security Redistribution 316 Employers 
Corporate tax Fiscal Redistribution, espe-
cially from capital 
owners 
40 Companies 
Gift tax Redistribution  0.3 Those receiving sizable gifts. 
Inheritance tax Redistribution  2 Those inheriting. 
Wealth tax Redistribution Fiscal 5 Those owning wealth. 
Real estate tax Fiscal, tax base with low elas-
ticity. 
Redistribution 13 Those owning real estate. 
Annual vehicle 
tax 
Fiscal, tax base exhibit low 
elasticity. 
Externality motiva-
tion, since car use 
give rise to external-
ities.  
8 Those owning a car or a motor 
cycle. 
CO2 tax on petrol 
and diesel 
Externality motivation. Fiscal, low price 
elasticity of demand. 
24 Those buying fuels for transport 
purposes cars or motor cycles. 
Alcohol tax Externality motivation. Fiscal 11 Those buying alcohol. 
A Primary motivation refers to the main explicit function of the tax. 
B Secondary motivation refers to whether the tax fulfils other political goals. Note that fiscally motivated taxes, 
naturally, are used for something supposedly good, including transfer between individuals as well as within 
group of individuals over time. This implies that a fiscal motive is a prerequisite for many of the typical redis-
tributive goals that a general welfare state is associated with (e.g. finance education, health care). 
C Revenues are from Swedish Tax Agency (STA, 2005, table 4.1, 5.1, 6.9, and 7.11) and show the relative im-
portance of the tax from a public budget perspective. 
 
 
 
In Table 3, we present the summary statistics of our explanatory variables. It is important to 
note that, even though the full sample (those who have an opinion of at least one of the taxes) 
is representative for the population at large, the restricted sample differs from the original one. 
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In Table 3, the variables where the means differ significantly between the two samples are 
bold. We see that those who regard themselves as having good knowledge about society are 
more likely than others to have an opinion about all taxes, while those who think they have no 
or little knowledge are less likely to answer all the questions. The same goes for people living 
in low income households. We also see that females are quite heavily underrepresented in the 
restricted sample. Moreover, it is clear that house owners, those with access to a car and those 
who drink alcohol regularly, tend to be overrepresented in the restricted sample, i.e. compared 
to the population at large. Finally, we see that that the age composition differs between the 
samples.  
 
Table 3. Summary statistics
 
 
Variable Variable description Full sample Restricted 
sample 
(n=701) 
  Obs Mean Mean 
 
Political distrust Trust for the Swedish Parliament is 1 or 2 on a five grade scale 1747 0.24 0.23 
Political trust Trustfor the Swedish Parliament is 4 or 5 on a five grade scale 1709 0.31 0.33 
Subjective high knowledge Subjective knowledge about society is 7-10 on a scale 0-10 1694 0.31 0.38 
Subjective low knowledge Subjective knowledge about society is 0-3 on a scale 0-10 1694 0.21 0.13 
Regularly reading newspaper Reading morning newspaper 6 or 7 days per week  1754 0.62 0.63 
Female  1774 0.50 0.38 
Age 15-30 years  1774 0.20 0.13 
Age 31-60 years  1774 0.52 0.66 
Age 61-85 years  1774 0.29 0.20 
University or college Studies at university or university degree 1743 0.29 0.32 
High income Household yearly income exceeds 400kSEK (single adult) or 600kSEK (two or more) 1653 0.19 0.21 
Low income Household yearly income is less than 100kSEK (single adult) or 200kSEK (two) 1653 0.33 0.25 
Left Political Left if 1 or 2 on a five grade scale from left to right 1682 0.34 0.33 
Right Political Right if 4 or 5 on a five grade scale from left to right 1682 0.33 0.30 
Company owner  1494 0.10 0.12 
House owner  1774 0.52 0.57 
Access to car Has access to car in the household 1744 0.84 0.89 
Drinks alcohol every week Drinks alcohol once or several times per week 1731 0.34 0.41 
Worry climate change Worried over climate change is 1 on a four grade scale from very to not at all 1697 0.37 0.36 
Worry alcohol Worried over increased alcohol consumption is 1 on a four grade scale from very to not at all 1699 0.23 0.19 
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3.2 Estimation method 
In order to analyse the attitude towards decreased taxes we run logit regressions where the 
dependent variable is whether one thinks that the tax level ought to be decreased (=1) com-
pared to other alternatives (=0) on the full sample. We also run logits where the dependent 
variable is if one wants to increase tax compared to the other alternatives. These regressions 
have different sample sizes, since we for each tax include all respondents who have an opin-
ion about the tax in question. The results from these regressions are presented in Table 4. 
For each tax we can then see what explains the attitudes. However, since we use 
different samples we cannot say anything about general opinions of different categories of 
respondents, such as women or low income earners. To be able to compare the estimates be-
tween tax regressions directly for each explanatory variable, we construct a restricted sample 
containing 701 respondents who have an opinion about all eleven taxes. The drawback with 
such a sample is of course that we miss those who have a very determined opinion about 
some taxes, but lack opinion about others. In Table 5 we present the results from regressions 
on attitudes towards decreases and increases of the taxes on the restricted sample (n=701).  
Since respondents’ attitudes towards levels of different taxes can be expected to 
correlate (e.g., a respondent’s attitude towards the level of municipal income tax might be 
correlated with the attitude towards the state income tax) we control for this potential fact in 
the estimation via a seemingly unrelated procedure, i.e. acknowledging that the errors associ-
ated with the dependent variables may be correlated across “tax regressions”.9 The explana-
                                                 
9 In fact, we find that a hypothesis that coefficients are equal across models can generally be rejected, hence 
supporting the relevance of estimating tax specific regressions. 
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tory variables used in the estimations, of which all are dummy variables, are assumed to be 
exogenous.  
4 Regression results 
We present the results in three subsections. In 4.1 our focus is mainly upon what explains the 
attitudes towards each tax separately. In 4.2 we study the results from our restricted sample 
and make comparisons between the tax regressions. Finally, in 4.3, we present a more in 
depth discussion of two policy examples, i.e., the recent abolition of the Swedish gift and in-
heritance taxes and the public’s support for a continued green tax shift where the CO2 tax is 
increased and the tax on labour decreased. 
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Table 4. Explanations of the attitude towards decreased tax (=1), logit coefficients (seemingly unrelated estimation procedure, n=1441 ).  
 Municipal 
income tax 
State income 
tax 
Payroll tax Corporate tax Gift tax Inheritance 
tax 
Wealth tax Real estate 
tax 
Vehicle tax CO2 tax Alcohol tax 
Decreased tax=1, increased tax or neither increase nor decrease =0 
Political trust  -0.175 -0.201 0.272 0.098 0.090 0.186 0.073 0.148 -0.157 -0.288** 0.090 
Political distrust  0.618*** 0.622*** 0.396** 0.221 0.215 0.109 0.011 0.124 0.188 0.607*** 0.397*** 
Subjective high knowledge of society 0.065 0.083 -0.364** -0.001 -0.227 -0.280* -0.081 -0.136 -0.214* -0.356*** 0.014 
Subjective low knowledge of society  0.419*** 0.330** 0.114 0.177 -0.300* -0.216 -0.113 0.348* 0.323** 0.275* -0.092 
Regularly reading newspaper -0.322** -0.102 -0.158 -0.120 0.163 0.079 0.051 0.251* -0.282** -0.341*** -0.309** 
Female 0.006 0.076 0.040 -0.080 0.330** -0.089 -0.222* 0.144 0.352*** -0.237** -0.428*** 
Age 15-30  -0.213 -0.208 0.365* 0.890*** 0.455*** 0.303* -0.022 0.170 0.169 0.011 -0.030 
Age 61-85 -0.008 0.181 0.096 -0.234 0.605*** 0.540*** 0.836*** 0.597*** 0.081 0.131 0.532*** 
University or College  -0.351*** -0.192 -0.032 -0.378* 0.022 0.196 -0.243* -0.185 -0.714*** -0.608*** -0.761*** 
High income 0.043 0.184 0.023 -0.036 -0.186 -0.252 0.517*** -0.364** -0.462*** -0.257* -0.131 
Low income 0.340** 0.510*** 0.110 0.367 -0.030 -0.194 0.213 0.291 0.276 0.504*** -0.207 
Left -0.436*** -0.590*** -0.799*** -1.232*** -0.833*** -0.829*** -1.073*** -0.890*** -0.852*** -0.616*** -0.349** 
Right 0.495*** 0.686*** 0.733*** 0.823*** 1.001*** 0.828*** 0.934*** 0.406** -0.308** 0.009 0.529*** 
Company owner   1.480*** 1.158***        
Home owner         0.901***    
Access to car          0.698*** 0.821***  
Drinks alcohol every week           1.060*** 
Worry climate change         -0.100 -0.537***  
Worry alcohol consumption           -1.066*** 
Constant 0.289* 0.098 0.392* -1.007*** 0.928*** 1.431*** -0.175 0.801*** 0.292 0.214 0.617*** 
Number of observations 1341 1325 1028 845 1264 1290 1278 1322 1341 1345 1360 
Log Likelihood  -863 -826 -603 -443 -601 -580 -758 -608 -841 -830 -794 
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
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Table 4.  continued 
 Municipal 
income tax 
State income 
tax 
Payroll tax Corporate tax Gift tax Inheritance 
tax 
Wealth tax Real estate 
tax 
Vehicle tax CO2 tax Alcohol tax 
Increased tax=1, decreased tax or neither increase nor decrease =0 
Political trust  0.224 0.271 -0.004 -0.185 -0.345 -0.011 0.268 -0.488 0.208 0.216 -0.041 
Political distrust  -0.267 -0.582 -0.034 0.098 0.075 0.271 0.540*** -0.230 -0.311 -0.414*** -0.280 
Subjective high knowledge of society -0.161 -0.287 0.520 0.379* 0.236 0.460* 0.045 -0.094 0.516** 0.375*** -0.229 
Subjective low knowledge of society  -0.079 -0.998** -0.599 -0.045 -0.105 0.117 0.129 -0.200 -0.081 -0.111 0.362* 
Regularly reading newspaper 0.309 0.213 -0.699* -0.425** 0.332 0.230 -0.190 -0.762* 0.574** 0.316 -0.048 
Female -0.495** -0.652** 0.499 0.046 -0.391 -0.074 0.186 0.263 -0.187 0.027 0.210 
Age 15-30  -0831** 0.048 -0.714 -0.810** -0.546 -0.614 -0.075 -0.832 0.047 0.284 0.104 
Age 61-85 -0.067 0.091 0.684 0.437** -0.659* -0.982** -0.550*** -0.203 -0.220 -0.146 -0.345 
University or College  0.514** 0.939*** -0.297 0.007 -0.310 0.077 -0.115 0.447 0.894*** 1.006*** 0.569*** 
High income -0.172 -0.432 0.225 0.091 0.269 0.189 -0.195 0.376 0.849*** 0.281 0.446** 
Low income 0.040 -0.043 -0.242 -0.057 -0.028 0.684** 0.076 -0.268 -0.306 -0.434* -0.257 
Left 0.643** 0.860*** 1.136*** 0.800*** 1.152*** 0.986*** 0.686*** 2.070*** 1.044*** 0.845*** 0.250 
Right -0.828** -1.170** -1.238* -1.086*** -0.682 -0.314 -1.211*** 1.094* 0.076 -0.164 -0.312 
Company owner   0.179 -0.491        
House owner         -1.709***    
Access to car          -1.453*** -1.116***  
Drinks alcohol every week           -1.902*** 
Worry climate change         0.602** 0.796***  
Worry alcohol consumption           1.428*** 
Constant -2.796*** -2.979*** -3.576*** -1.178*** -3.228*** -3.783*** -1.266*** -4.122*** -3.213*** -2.202*** -2.022*** 
Number of observations 1341 1325 1028 845 1264 1290 1278 1322 1341 1345 1360 
Log Likelihood  -282 -237 -143 -396 -215 -223 -612 -109 -274 -470 -447 
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
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Table 5. Explanations of the attitude towards tax changes (=1), logit coefficients, restricted sample (seemingly unrelated estimation procedure, n=701 ).  
 Municipal 
income tax 
State income 
tax 
Payroll tax Corporate tax Gift tax Inheritance 
tax 
Wealth tax Real estate 
tax 
Vehicle tax CO2 tax Alcohol tax 
Decreased tax=1, increased tax or neither increase nor decrease =0 
Political trust  -0.255 -0.243 0.328 0.114 0.023 0.309 0.054 0.113 0.092 -0.124 0.272 
Political distrust  0.516*** 0.637*** 0.415** 0.279 -0.005 -0.028 0.145 0.098 0.038 0.424** 0.430** 
Subjective high knowledge of society 0.191 0.042 -0.327* -0.140 -0.248 -0.256 0.009 -0.014 -0.089 -0.307* 0.124 
Subjective low knowledge of society  0.384 0.370 0.143 -0.166 -0.290 -0.196 -0.111 0.050 0.109 -0.006 0.124 
Regularly reading newspaper -0.399** -0.063 -0.226 -0.145 0.292 0.115 0.104 0.230 -0.474*** -0.514*** -0.548*** 
Female 0.050 0.100 -0.110 0.038 -0.073 -0.386* -0.188 0.136 0.366** -0.463*** -0.559*** 
Age 15-30  -0.014 0.132 0.290 0.990*** 0.838*** 0.645* 0.214 0.219 0.177 0.059 0.081 
Age 61-85 0.186 0.247 -0.093 -0.095 0.509**** 0.576*** 0.988*** 0.607*** -0.135 -0.213 0.266 
University or College  -0.464** -0.431** -0.197 -0.500** -0.086 0.070 -0.321 -0.149 -0.897*** -0.756*** -1.025*** 
High income -0.095 0.341 0.140 0.151 -0.023 -0.279 0.357 -0.758*** -0.616*** -0.190 0.180 
Low income 0.626* 0.773** -0.062 0.079 0.739* 0.546 0.140 -0.372 0.361 0.798** 0.165 
Left -0.256 -0.402** -0.870*** -1.302*** -1.057*** -1.242*** -1.272*** -0.874*** -0.696*** -0.618*** -0.351 
Right 0.700*** 1.044*** 0.964*** 0.722*** 1.069*** 0.746** 0.866*** 0.642** -0.071 0.097 0.537** 
Company owner   1.368*** 1.272***        
Home owner         1.035***    
Access to car          0.669** 1.057***  
Drinks alcohol every week           0.967*** 
Worry climate change         0.033 -0.734***  
Worry alcohol consumption           -0.928*** 
Constant 0.200 -0.101 0.445* -0.927*** 0.918*** 1.548*** -0.251 0.628** 0.268 0.304 0.757*** 
Number of observations 701 701 701 701 701 701 701 701 701 701 701 
Log Likelihood  -446 -425 -404 -368 -353 -325 -411 -339 -447 -429 -402 
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Table 5.  continued  
 Municipal 
income tax 
State income 
tax 
Payroll tax Corporate tax Gift tax Inheritance 
tax 
Wealth tax Real estate 
tax 
Vehicle tax CO2 tax Alcohol tax 
Increased tax=1, decreased tax or neither increase nor decrease =0 
Political trust  0.514 0.356 0.009 -0.187 -0.644 -0.357 0.328 -0.396 0.423 0.355 -0.179 
Political distrust  -0.017 -0.618 -0.114 0.005 0.145 0.520 0.482** -0.537 0.076 -0.049 -0.508 
Subjective high knowledge of society -0.652* -0.104 0.528 0.440* -0.144 0.262 -0.161 -0.237 0.299 0.255 -0.323 
Subjective low knowledge of society  -0.320 -0.885 -0.634 0.113 -0.023 0.596 -0.169 -0.282 0.630 0.396 -0.017 
Regularly reading newspaper 0.083 0.357 -0.826** -0.543** 0.252 0.132 -0.187 -0.580 0.875*** 0.207 0.241 
Female -0.308 -0.248 0.764** 0.019 -0.070 0.146 0.085 -0.231 -0.321 0.063 0.433* 
Age 15-30  -1.282* -0.274 -0.559 -1.068*** -1.792** -1.940** -0.230 -0.691 -0.075 -0.048 0.207 
Age 61-85 0.281 -0.101 0.749* -0.443* -0.050 -0.549 -0.448** 0.190 0.323 0.135 0.046 
University or College  1.059*** 1.153** -0.554 0.130 0.035 0.275 -0.188 0.717 1.459*** 1.452*** 0.704** 
High income -0.284 -0.989 0.765 0.064 -0.024 0.068 0.004 1.951*** 0.717* 0.060 0.055 
Low income -1.083 -1.003 0.369 -0.222 -0.291 -1.007 -0.189 0.760 -0.248 -1.17* -0.169 
Left 0.924** 0.605 1.194** 0.908*** 1.507*** 1.426*** 0.829*** 2.666*** 0.913** 0.779** 0.096 
Right -0.663 -1.189** -1.615* -1.425*** -0.771 -0.334 -1.310*** 0.272 -0.101 -0.050 -0.573 
Company owner   -0.176 -0.608*        
Home owner         -2.178***    
Access to car          -1.249*** -1.344***  
Drinks alcohol every week           -1.542*** 
Worry climate change         0.610** 0.918***  
Worry alcohol consumption           1.211*** 
Constant -3.087*** -3.006*** -3.467*** -1.191*** -3.289*** -3.750*** -1.054*** -4.442*** -3.798*** -2.323*** -2.221*** 
Number of observations 701 701 701 701 701 701 701 701 701 701 701 
Log Likelihood  -142 -136 -111 -303 -132 -130 -338 -63 -157 -242 -208 
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
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4.1 Attitudes towards different taxes 
Proceeding from Table 4, i.e. the full sample, we can analyse what affects the attitudes to-
wards each of the eleven taxes. We notice that, for both municipal and state income taxes, 
different kinds of knowledge are very important, which is in line with our H4. First, those 
who regard themselves as having very low knowledge about society are more likely than oth-
ers to advocate income tax cuts. Second, respondents with university education are more 
likely to or even want to increase these taxes. Third, regular newspaper readers are less likely 
than others to be in favor of a decreased municipal income tax. One possible explanation is of 
course the one emphasised in Gemmell et al. (2004), i.e., that those who mispredict tax liabili-
ties tend to over-estimate them. It could be the case that uninformed respondents think that 
taxes are higher than they actually are and therefore are more likely to be in favour of income 
tax cuts. It could also be the case that those with more knowledge have a greater understand-
ing of the public sector and therefore a higher expected marginal utility of it. This would 
make them more supportive towards higher income taxes than others. 
 Also when it comes to taxes paid by employers, the knowledge variables appear 
to be important. Those who think they know a lot about society are less likely to advocate 
decreased payroll taxes, while regular newspaper readers are less likely support increases of 
both the payroll and the corporate taxes. The youngest respondents are also more likely than 
others to be in favour of cuts in these taxes, as are company owners. This supports our H1, 
i.e., that preferences are driven by self interest.  
 The wealth tax has least support among the oldest respondents. Also high in-
come earners are more likely than others to support a decreased or abolished wealth tax. We 
do not have any information about the respondents’ taxable wealth, but it is likely that wealth 
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is correlated with high income and that more old people hold wealth, especially in terms of 
real estate. The real estate tax is the most unpopular of our studied taxes, and not very surpris-
ingly house owners are the most reluctant to it. Regular newspaper reading also decreases the 
support for this tax, which may be a result of exceptionally strong negative media coverage of 
this tax during recent years. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, however, high income earners 
are less likely than lower income groups to support a decreased real estate tax.    
 For the annual vehicle tax, a high level of perceived knowledge about society 
increases the support. Car owners are more likely to prefer a tax cut and those who worry 
about climate change want the vehicle tax to be higher. These results support our first and 
third hypotheses. Moreover, women are less likely to support tax cuts, and high income earn-
ers and those with university education are more likely to advocate an increased vehicle tax 
than others. 
 The attitudes towards the CO2 tax are affected by car ownership and concerns 
for climate change. We also see that low income earners are more eager than others to cut the 
tax, while high income earners are less likely to support a lower tax. For the CO2 tax, political 
trust and distrust are also important. The relationship is ‘symmetrical’; those who trust politi-
cians are less likely than others to plead for a decreased tax, while those who distrust the poli-
ticians want the CO2 tax to be lower. Knowledge is important also for this tax. In this case 
also the motivation of the tax could be an explanation. The corrective nature of the tax may be 
complex to understand, so that information could increase understanding and acceptance for 
the CO2 tax. 
 The motive for the alcohol tax is also corrective and also for this tax different 
kinds of knowledge increase support of the tax. Those who drink at least once a week tend to 
be more eager than others to get a tax cut while those who worry about increased alcohol con-
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sumption in society are more likely to want a higher alcohol tax. These results also support 
our first and third hypotheses. 
   
4.2 How do different properties affect the preferred tax structure? 
Hence, attitudes to different taxes are explained differently and it is too simplified to only talk 
about people’s general attitudes towards taxation as such.  
When analysing Table 5 with the same sample in all regressions, we can make 
other comparisons than in the previous section, by looking at the size of the coefficients. The 
taxes that people were most eager to reduce were the now abolished inheritance and gift taxes 
together with the real estate and alcohol taxes. The corporate tax is the only tax that people 
actually did not want to cut. People generally do not want to raise taxes and the strongest re-
sistance is towards increasing the real estate tax. The least resistance is towards increased 
wealth tax, followed by increased corporate tax.  
We see that political distrust implies a stronger wish for lower taxes on income 
(municipal, state, payroll), CO2, and alcohol, while the factor is insignificant for the other 
taxes. In H2 we hypothesised that political distrust should have a stronger impact on taxes 
generating large tax revenues and on taxes where the state is paternalistic in the sense of aim-
ing at changing behaviour (CO2 and alcohol). This seems to be the case. Those who distrust 
politicians do not want to hand over too much power and do not trust them to correct market 
failure in a proper way.  
 We include the political left/right dimension to control for a general attitude 
towards taxation and the public sector. Leftists are more likely to support higher taxes and 
rightists tend to be more positive to decreasing taxes. The only exceptions are, interestingly, 
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the vehicle and CO2 taxes where we cannot find any right wing effect and the alcohol tax, 
where left wing voters are not more supportive than those in the political middle. These taxes 
are all corrective, rather than fiscal, which could be the reason why the traditional left/right 
scale is less applicable.  
Subjective knowledge loses statistical significance in the restricted sample. This 
is probably due to the fact that more people in the restricted sample have high subjective 
knowledge. However, we see that regular newspaper readers are less supportive towards de-
creases of the municipal income tax, the vehicle tax, the CO2 tax and the alcohol tax. Regular 
newspaper readers are also more positive towards an increase of the vehicle tax, but more 
reluctant to increase the payroll tax. This can be due to the aforementioned knowledge effect 
of corrective taxes.  
University studies increase support for income and corrective taxes. However, 
on purely redistributive taxes we find no such effects. Hence, highly educated respondents 
would like to see a tax structure with more environmental and less redistributive taxation. 
There seems to be a self interest dimension judging from the fact that home 
owners are more negative to the real estate tax, those with access to a car are more negative 
towards the CO2 tax and the vehicle tax, those who drink regularly are more negative to the 
alcohol tax, and company owners more positive to decreasing the payroll tax and the corpo-
rate tax. Note also that high income earners are less likely to be positive to decreasing taxes 
on real estate and vehicles, while they are more positive to decreasing the wealth tax. In addi-
tion, we find that low income earners are more positive to decreases of municipal and state 
income taxes and the CO2 tax, indicating that those who supposedly are most depending on 
the welfare state tend to be the most positive to decreasing the taxes financing it. However, as 
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we noted in the theoretical model, we also have an income effect, indicating that a tax cut 
would mean a lot to a low income household and this latter effect seems to dominate.  
Women are more positive to decreasing the vehicle tax, while they are less posi-
tive to decrease the CO2 tax and the tax on alcohol. They are more willing to increase the pay-
roll tax and also the alcohol tax. We also note that older people (age 61-85 compared to age 
31-60) are more likely to be positive to decreased taxes on wealth, gifts, inheritances, alcohol, 
and real estate, while younger people are more likely to be positive to decreased payroll taxes, 
the corporate tax, and taxes on gifts and inheritances. 
 
4.3 Two policy examples 
In 2004, a Government Commission (SOU 2004:36) proposed reductions in the inheritance, 
gift and wealth taxes in Sweden. The Social Democratic government chose not only to reduce, 
but to completely abolish the gift and inheritance taxes, while it made no change to the wealth 
tax. Many people, especially economists, were surprised by this unwillingness to cut the 
wealth tax, which many think is a highly inefficient tax.  
 However, from a political economy perspective, a support maximizing govern-
ment sets taxes to minimize political costs rather than maximising efficiency.10 Abolishing the 
gift and inheritance taxes had great support among the Swedish electorate. The two taxes that 
people were most anxious to decrease were these two taxes, and even left-wing respondents, 
                                                 
10 Hettich and Winer (1988) show that the equilibrium tax structure in an economy governed by a support-
maximising government differs from the optimal taxation structure that takes no political concern. 
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who are generally reluctant to tax cuts, wanted the inheritance tax to be reduced.11 A reduc-
tion of the wealth tax would have had much lower support. Apparently, respondents do not 
find the idea of cutting the wealth tax particularly attractive. Especially left-wing voters are 
reluctant to a lower wealth tax implying a high political cost of reducing it. Also concerning 
tax revenues, abolishing the inheritance and gift taxes came at a much lower cost than abol-
ishing the real estate tax would.12  
During the period 2001- 2010, the Swedish government has imposed a so called 
green tax reform. This reform is constituted by a shift, which means that taxes on environ-
mentally harmful activities are raised while the tax on labour is reduced. One of the aims is to 
reduce emissions of carbon dioxide, which contribute to the greenhouse effect. Another is of 
course to incorporate distributional and welfare consequences in environmental politics.  In 
the budget for 2006 the Government proposes a green tax shift of SEK 3.6 billion.13  Of con-
cern here is whether we from our figures can say something about the prospects for this shift 
to gain popular support. If we glance at Table 1, we see that taxes on labour income are more 
unpopular than the CO2 tax. Hence, one could expect a general support for this kind of tax 
reform. In fact, apart from the wealth and corporate taxes, the CO2 tax is the most “popular” 
tax to increase out of the eleven taxes. However, the attitudes differ across voters. For exam-
                                                 
11 From Table 1 we remember that about 50% of the respondents wanted to abolish or decrease these two taxes a 
lot. 
12 The tax revenues from the inheritance and gift taxes were together SEK 2.3 billions in 2003, while the real 
estate tax brought 13 billions to the Treasury.  
13 The total shift amount to approx. 3,3 billion Euro and until the year 2005, the shift amounted to approx. 1,5 
billion Euro. In exchange for the tax increases in 2006, there will be tax reductions amounting to an equivalent 
sum. Income tax will be lowered by SEK 2.5 billion by raising the basic income tax allowance. Solo 
entrepreneurs who take on an employee will pay reduced employer's contributions.  www.sweden.gov.se 
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ple, although our reference respondent is not particularly eager to decrease the CO2 tax, low 
income earners and car owners certainly are. That car owners are less supportive may not 
come as a surprise. However, that low income earners – i.e., one of the main groups to whom 
the shift is addressed – are more anxious to reduce the CO2 tax than income taxes, is startling. 
Seen from our results, they hardly support the reform at all. Those who read the newspaper at 
least six days a week, however, think that the payroll tax is important to reduce, while they do 
not want to see a reduced CO2 tax. The same goes for respondents with a university education 
who do not want to reduce the CO2 tax, and actually regard this tax as the least undesirable to 
increase out of the eleven. Both these facts point to the potential importance of knowledge 
and information. It is likely that newspaper readers and people with higher education have 
more knowledge about taxes than others. If this is the case, increased support, also among low 
income earners and car owners could possibly be gained through increased information. 
If taxes on labour should be cut, support for decreasing the payroll tax is 
stronger than decreasing the tax on labour income. From economic theory we know that the 
real tax incidence should be independent of whether the tax is levied on the supply or demand 
side, so that a payroll and earned income tax would be equivalent. Apparently this does not 
hold for the voters’ attitudes. They want the payroll tax to be lower, but want the state income 
tax to remain constant.  
 
5 Concluding Discussion 
This paper has pointed at the relative public opinions of different taxes. As expected, we find 
that most Swedes would like most taxes to be decreased, but we also find that taxes differ in 
acceptance. The most unpopular tax is the tax on real estate, which 77 % of our restricted 
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sample would like to cut, while only 32 % wishes to see a reduced corporate tax. Not only 
total support differs between taxes. Also different categories of respondents differ in relative 
support of taxes. In accordance with our first hypothesis we find a strong self-interest effect 
on attitudes. In comparison, house owners are more eager to cut the real estate tax than others, 
company owners are particularly reluctant to payroll and corporate taxes, car owners want to 
decrease the vehicle and the CO2 tax more than others, while those who drink alcohol on a 
regular basis are more willing than others to decrease the alcohol tax. 
 Our second hypothesis stated that those who distrust politicians prefer lower 
taxes than others. This is supported by our data for the most revenue bringing taxes and for 
the corrective taxes, as hypothesised. Corrective taxes are also most supported by those con-
cerned with the issue, as hypothesised in H3. Those who worry about climate change are more 
positive than others to the vehicle and CO2 taxes, while those who worry about the increased 
alcohol consumption in society do not want the alcohol tax to be lower. We also find that dif-
ferent kinds of information and education actually increase the preferred tax levels of income 
and corrective taxes. 
 Our forth hypothesis stated that education and knowledge should increased pre-
ferred tax levels. This turns out to hold for corrective taxes and for the municipal income tax, 
but not for the other taxes. 
 We also performed two minor case studies of Swedish tax policy – the abolition 
of the gift and inheritance taxes and the green tax reform. We concluded that the abolition of 
the two transfer taxes had great support among voters. The investigation that proposed a re-
duction of these taxes also proposed a reduction of the wealth tax, which is far more popular, 
especially among left-wing voters. This could be an explanation to why the Swedish Social 
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Democratic government chose to abolish the two most unpopular taxes while keep the more 
popular tax.  
 The Swedish green tax shift, where the CO2 tax is increased and the tax on la-
bour decreased, gain, although only implicitly studied via the relative support for the respec-
tive taxes, rather week support. However, education and (subjective) knowledge are important 
factors for attitudes to the CO2 tax. Given that these factors correlate with ‘informed’ indi-
viduals, information campaigns on the functioning of the CO2 tax as compared to other cli-
mate policy instruments; it might be possible to generate additional support for the tax shift. 
However, there are counteracting opinions among different categories, where low income 
earners think that the CO2 tax is the most desirable to decrease after the inheritance and gift 
taxes.  
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